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This paper addresses the theme of ‘widening student access, participation 
and lifelong learning’ within the wider issue of ‘measuring excellence’ 
in UK higher education and finds them both to be problematic. An earlier 
paper entitled ‘Inclusion in an age of mobility’ (Traxler 2016) written 
over four years ago made the case that the inclusion agenda of UK higher 
education of 1990s was largely a failure in its own terms but had in any 
case been made irrelevant by the subsequent onset of pervasive and ubiq-
uitous connectivity and mobility, profoundly transforming the produc-
tion, ownership, distribution and nature of learning and knowing and 
problematising the role and status of universities and lecturers.   
The rhetorical twist was to argue that, yes, inclusion was neces-
sary but no longer the inclusion of people from the outside world selec-
tively invited into the higher education system but the inclusion of the 
higher education system into the world outside. A different rhetoric twist 
went un-noticed, that of the demise of social mobility alongside the in-
creasing mobility of people and societies. 
The current paper takes this discussion forward, asking what has 
changed and by how much. It addresses the emergence of the idea of the 
Fourth Industrial Revolution, the hollowing out of the labour market and 
other contextual concerns; it addresses the changed financial, regulatory 
and political environment of UK higher education, and how this has 
driven the need to measure and compared; and it addresses the interplay 
between the two, but in the continued context of mobility and connect-
edness. The discussion is however overtaken firstly by Brexit and then 
completely overtaken by the COVID-19 pandemic. At this stage, in the 
middle of the current crisis and possibly lacking a stable historical per-
spective, we could nevertheless ask, will the mobilities or postdigital per-
spectives, two emerging but perhaps competing world views, still have 
any meaning or significance, or is it in the process of being swamped by 
the pandemic? 
 
Inclusion in an age of mobility 
The first part of an earlier case (Traxler 2016) rested on the contention 
that in unequal societies, the only consequence of inclusion, participation 
and opportunity was to reinforce inequality and exclusion, taking stu-
dents from the bottom of the socio-economic pyramid, putting them 
through the least prestigious universities, saddling them with debt and 
putting them, now basically indentured, back at the bottom of the pyra-
mid, but now able when necessary to service the existing but unequal 
economic order. This seemed, from European and American official and 
academic perspectives and sources, to be a largely uncontentious asser-
tion.   
The policies, in their various instantiations, could be seen as the 
consequence of the centre-left thinking that pervaded public policy in the 
1990s. Their failures could probably be ascribed to the aspiration to make 
major changes in society through only minor changes in education, with-
out the necessary changes anywhere else in the political, social and eco-
nomic ordering of society.  
The second part of the case was the contention that universities 
were still, in the 2000s, perfecting and deploying the educational tech-
nologies of the 1990s, that students’ digital lives before, after and along-
side university were increasingly divergent from their digital lives within 
universities, and that the need was not for students to better included in 
the world of universities but for universities to be better included in the 
world of students... and better included in the rest of the world.  
The earlier paper did not address the issue of excellence, what it 
might mean and how it might be measured. The earlier paper did how-
ever question the purpose of education and without some clear notion of 
this purpose, it is difficult to define the nature of excellence or specify 
how it might be measured. Of course, this was always going to be a tricky 
and contentious topic, some students, parents and employers having per-
haps rather different ideas from others, those in some disciplines having 
rather different ideas from those in others, some on the political or eco-
nomic left having different ideas from those on the right and different 
universities and departments having different ideas about their mission 
and market to others. So, perhaps vagueness was always likely to be the 
safe option. 
In relation to the specific questions of measurement being ad-
dressed here, clearly our earlier analysis breaks into two perspectives, 
the first, inward-looking, the second, outward-looking. 
The first perspective is universities pursuing their various imple-
mentations of inclusion, opportunity and participation. Being institu-
tional agendas, they are, by their nature, bound to be measurable, to have 
come into being with targets, outcomes and KPIs, key performance indi-
cators, already formed around them and to have professionals and de-
partments tasked with shaping the delivery of these agendas in ways spe-
cifically crafted to deliver these targets, outcomes and KPIs. One could 
almost cynically suggest that this is how policy usually mutates into 
strategy and how professionals and departments game the system.   
Our second perspective is of universities being left behind by an 
ever more mobile world. This is, by its nature, a world of change and of 
mess, perhaps a world of mobility, one needing the new ‘mobile empiri-
cal’ (Büscher and Urry, 2009) when it finally arrives, and of ‘liquid mo-
dernity’ (Bauman 2000). This might excuse our inability to measure. It 
is a world irreducible to quantity and number, but this only draws atten-
tion to the discrepancy between the world of movement, and those static 
institutions of government that try to manage and control it. 
Finally, we ought to pick up our remark about ‘the rest of the 
world’. It means in this context, the Global South and the Third and 
Fourth Worlds (Donner 2010). These were however beyond the scope of 
the original paper. Given the impact of globalisation, especially as un-
derpinned by global digital connectedness, this has become undoubtedly 
an error and an omission, but still perhaps beyond the scope of any kind 
of measurement as currently conceived. Perhaps the global COVID-19 
pandemic will reconfigure our understanding of these classifications, as 
for example, different economies, sectors and businesses recover – or not 
– differentially. 
What Has Changed / Is Changing? 
Since the earlier paper, we have seen the emergence and consolidation 
of earlier economic, social, ecological, academic, technological and po-
litical trends and trajectories, both locally and globally. These all impact 
on the nature and need for inclusion, perhaps for the inclusion of, say, 
non-traditional students within the higher education but more so for the 
inclusion of the sector itself within the communities of non-traditional 
students.  
The technological trends that were perhaps discrete were artificial in-
telligence (AI), the Internet of Things (IoT), robotics and performance 
support, are now subsumed, branded and often lauded uncritically as the 
Fourth Industrial Revolution. The literature seems sometimes upbeat, 
underpinned by technological determinism, and perhaps naïve, in its at-
tempts at forecasting and predicting positive change, but not always (Pe-
ters, Jandrić, & Means, 2019). This is part of what has been characterised 
and criticised as megatrends and futures thinking, (Slaughter 1993; Haj-
kowicz 2015; Gidley 2010). In terms of our discussions of inclusion, 
there is now a need to analyse, synthesise and reconcile the world views 
based around such megatrends and the world views we described based 
around mobility and connectedness, which may themselves constitute a 
megatrend. Such analysis and synthesis would undoubtedly argue for a 
higher education sector that sought to be adapted and ‘included’ in the 
world of such trends. Higher education has, however, currently got other 
things on its collective mind during the current pandemic. 
The political trends that have been pushed to the foreground are pop-
ulism, nationalism, and neo-liberalism, alongside the erosion of liberal-
ism and internationalism. These trends were all latent at the time of the 
earlier work and their emergence has only strengthened the need for a 
higher education sector engaged and ‘included’ in its society. A further 
emerging trend in the global political discourse is the rise of post-truth, 
alt-facts and fake-news alongside the denigration of expertise – expertise 
being of course sadly the major output or value added of the higher edu-
cation sector globally. This perhaps underlines the argument for the sec-
tor engaging as actively and critically as possible, for the ‘inclusion’ we 
described earlier, with those communities outside the world of higher 
education.   
It would however be naïve for anyone writing from a British perspec-
tive to ignore Brexit but, on the other hand, ambitious of them to predict 
the outcomes and consequences of it. Brexit will clearly radically change 
the nature of the UK economy, in for example its trading partners, its 
industrial capacity and its products and services. This will impact differ-
ent regions and countries and different classes and demographics of the 
UK differently and thus impact the nature and purpose of the education 
system supporting the economy. Political change will, as ever, determine 
the nature of access to education.  The UK’s democratically determined 
and democratically managed withdrawal from the EU continues to be 
worrying. What has been more worrying has been the extent to which 
the process has strengthened the extremes in British politics, both in 
terms of policies and behaviour, at the expense of constitutional pro-
cesses and any tradition of moderation and respect.  
Sadly, at the time of writing, the COVID-19 pandemic has overtaken 
Brexit as the determinant of national and global social and economic be-
haviours. This is as yet barely documented (Ayittey et al 2020, Hafiz et 
al 2020, Barro et al 2020) and is certainly not over. The competitive na-
ture of global academia does however ensure that the dearth of research 
papers will not last long. Any expectation that higher education will re-
sume its place and its role in some new normalcy - the so-called new 
normal - could be widely misplaced, and any of the factors or trends we 
describe and analyse here may subsequently have no meaning at all.  In 
the midst of the crisis, we see higher education making an unplanned 
lurch into home-working and online learning but we also see, for exam-
ple, nursing, medical and para-medical students rushed into the frontline, 
trainee teachers losing their work placements, assessments and exams 
reconfigured, recruitment targets and caps invalidated, casualised staff 
laid off and in research, we see projects suspended, fieldwork rejigged, 
conferences postponed, funding calls deferred and publications delayed.  
The new normalcy, when it finally happens, will be influenced by the 
wider context, for example by an impending recession and changed la-
bour market needs, and by assimilating the lessons to be learnt from 
wholly online teaching and remote working. In the current context, the 
impact of inclusion, in both the senses used in our discussion, will be 
significant changed and the institutional and national willingness and ca-
pacity to measure and understand inclusion will be transformed. 
The economic trends, insofar as they are independent of technological, 
social and demographic trends, have been of continued globalisation and 
increasing trade wars (Dicken 2003; Shangquan 2000; Meyer 2007). 
However, the current pandemic has suddenly taken centre stage. In the 
UK, and in much of the global North, unprecedented numbers of people 
and companies are seeking the support of a dramatically reduced tax-
base; small businesses and large business are mostly closed except for 
those with an online presence currently buckling under the pressure of 
inflated, fluctuating and distorted demands (Barua 2020).  
Many businesses, those still open, have exploded with demand and 
then imploded with staff illness and supply chain issues. So much of the 
retail sector is suffering, either from no customers or from too many, 
whilst tourism, hospitality, catering and transport, and many of the in-
dustries upstream like public transport and motor trades are also affected 
significantly. Banking and the financial sector are in unprecedented 
times. They are forced to provide loan, mortgage and interest holidays, 
and must play a major role in re-inflating economies once the pandemic 
recedes assuming governments have the appetite and resources for the 
necessary ‘quantitative easing’ (Fokas et al 2020). Public sector borrow-
ing must in many, many countries grow dramatically and with it the costs 
of servicing public debt.  
The continued emergence of the BRICs, especially China and its 
growing economic influence in Africa (Salisu & Akanni 2020), is now 
more uncertain especially as these countries all have large and relatively 
poor populations, and, in particular, China suffers from being the source 
of the current pandemic (and from being demonised for it in some quar-
ters). On the other hand, Europe and its economies, has also been hard 
hit by the pandemic, as too has that of the USA, and clearly the global 
disposition of the regions and their alignment will not be unchanged.   
Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, the university sector was not in 
good shape (Drayton & Waltmann 2020). In the UK, and perhaps else-
where, political trends have been reflected in the university sector by the 
transition from a dependence on government funding to a dependence on 
student fee income and thus on market forces. These forces are strongly 
influenced by league tables and by the public perceptions of the sector 
both as a means to an end, that is to successful entry to the jobs market, 
and an end in its own right, the idea of education as a public good.  
It is also a ticking time-bomb, to use the media metaphor, financially 
as the student loans are accounted as ‘loans’ in government book-keep-
ing, meaning they will get paid back, whereas 48% are a ‘debt’, meaning 
they will not get paid back, creating a hole, another metaphor, in public 
finance that currently approaches over £10bn1.  
                                                          
1 “…the Office for National Statistics (ONS) has stated that its new accounting method for stu-
dent loans would add over £10bn (specifically £10.6bn) to the UK government 2018 to 2019 
This is reflected in the gig economy (Kuhn 2016) and in the case of 
universities to what was referred to as casualization (Thorkelson 2016). 
The removal of any statutory retirement age may have further ossified 
the system as a viable career path leading to senior staff staying in the 
system with senior salaries. 
The social trends are perhaps reflected in recent attempts at (re)classi-
fications of social class that reflect the changes experiences and expec-
tations of, for example, the British population. Gone are the days of a 
linear and stable structure characterised by A, B, C1 etc (Rose & Harri-
son 2014) and instead we see the emergence of precarity (Quinlan 2016) 
based around zero-hours contracts, casualisation and the gig economy. 
This changed ordering of society may be reflected in the emergence 
newer categorisations like the ones that include a Precariat and a Tech-
nical Middle Class, in the Great British Class Survey of 2013 (Savage et 
al 2013). Again, we can expect Brexit but now also the COVID-19 pan-
demic to change the social and economic composition of many countries, 
and further destabilise the notion of ‘inclusion’. 
In a rather different sense, the earlier analysis and critique of higher 
education and inclusion lent on an account of society strongly influenced 
by the emerging ‘mobilities turn’ in sociology (Sheller 2017), a perspec-
tive asserting that social science were philosophically and methodologi-
cally rooted in statis whilst the world around us was no longer rooted, it 
was in motion. Movement, transience, change and turbulence were eve-
rywhere,  encompassing both the large-scale movements of people, ob-
jects, capital, and information across the world, as well as more local 
processes of daily transportation, movement through public space, and 
the travel of material things within everyday life (Urry, 2007). Not at the 
moment, not with the world of pandemic in lockdown - the balance be-
tween, say, the movement of ideas, people, goods and capital has been 
dramatically curtailed and transformed and will not spring back to the 
status quo ante when the all-clear sirens finally sounds.  
The academic trends are corporatism/privatisation, managerialism, 
globalisation, digital industrialisation and consumerism (Williams 
2012); these are perhaps only a reflection and microcosm of global trends 
in the overall political context we briefly describe above but we should 
explore the dynamic between the Fourth Industrial Revolution (Schwab 
2017) in the wider world and its instantiation in the academic one, where 
                                                          
deficit..” from https://labourlist.org/2019/06/uk-student-loans-expected-to-add-10bn-to-uk-
debt/ at 19 August 2019 
human labour is replaced by technological input, the capacity for critical 
stances is algorithmically reduced and technology is used to industrialise 
the production of intellectual capital. Understandably, even the Fourth 
Industrial Revolution, aka Industry4.0, is now subject to the impact of 
COVID-19 (Javaid et al 2020). 
As we said, we are writing in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic in 
mid-2020 and some analysists would see this as an extreme example of 
the convergence of some global trends, specifically increasing urbanisa-
tion, promoting the faster spread of infection, environmental degrada-
tion, causing the increased mutation of diseases and the rise of populism, 
with its assaults on the funding of public health services and on interna-
tional cooperation, and its preference for conspiracy theory over scien-
tific fact. Other analysts may see the COVID-19 pandemic in the bigger 
picture as basically spontaneous or random, having only local bacterio-
logical causes. Earlier work (Traxler & Lally 2015) had looked at a con-
vergence of global crises, the environmental, the economic, the political 
for example, and asked whether within higher education, digital learning 
was somehow complicit or at the very least compliant and acquiescent in 
servicing the global forces that underly these crises. Bringing this ques-
tion forward to the present and generalising slightly, if COVID-19 is not 
merely a bacteriological blip but in fact symptomatic of the global ma-
laise – no pun intended – we should ask about the role of higher educa-
tion. Is it complicit or compliant and uncritical of those same global 
forces, has it endorsed some of the forces propelling and propagating the 
pandemic, however peripherally?    
In the UK, the sector is still beset structurally by uncertainty and vol-
atility around policy and finance from central government, by debates 
trying to reconcile excellence with access, socially progressive fee struc-
tures for students with reduction of the tax burden, jobs-ready graduates 
(Culkin & Mallick 2011) with life-long learning, hard subject knowledge 
with transferable soft skills (Beckingham 2018; Belwal et al 2017) and 
these all within a public relations context featuring grade inflation 
(Bachan 2017), vice chancellor salaries (Walker et al 2019), faulty over-
seas investments (Altbach 2013; Wilkins & Huisman 2012), diploma 
mills (Noble 1998) and endemic plagiarism (Park 2003), lecturer stress 
and poor mental health (Berry & Cassidy 2013), poor governance and 
NDAs obscuring harassment, and other irregularities. These are not ran-
dom or disconnected but are the synergy between the managerialist cul-
ture engendered by neo-liberal government attitudes and the press pre-
pared, indeed keen, to print it. 
The earlier paper stressed the widening gulf between people’s digital 
experiences outside higher education and students’ digital experiences 
within higher education; this has gone unchecked and unchanged.   
At a deeper level the hollowing out of the labour market, the widening 
chasm that eventually leaves only the extremes of brain surgeon and 
street cleaner as indicative employment options (McIntosh 2013), pre-
sents a bigger and bigger challenge for any pretensions of social mobility 
and problematises the role of higher education, and its purpose (Bass 
1997). If it is not producing rounded individuals nor no longer finding 
them jobs what is exactly is education for? So, hovering above any dis-
cussion of inclusion and the relationships between those targeted for ‘in-
clusion’ and the higher education sector doing the ‘inclusion’ is this 
question, what exactly is education for? And how is it to be measured 
(Biesta 2009) 
Clearly, during and after the current pandemic, there is likely to be a 
major restructuring of the labour markets of many sectors, countries and 
regions. The current pandemic might provide some insights into the ca-
pacity of education to give people the resilience and resources to survive 
extraordinary pressures and stresses and perhaps these insights might 
still be preserved after the pandemic, as labour markets restructure and 
education is needed, not only to supply a changed labour markets but one 
offering many people little chance of entering those labour markets. 
Clearly, these various roles for education create competing definitions of 
inclusion downstream of our earlier dichotomy and problematise the na-
ture of relevance and the meaning of measurement. Much of this has still 
to be researched, analysed and published by scholars.  
This is, so far, a largely Euro-centric account. How does it resonate or 
resound elsewhere? This is clearly an important question but not one for 
the current discussion.  
Reconciling Inclusion, Measurement and Relevance 
Having outlined the contextual issues, we must however return to the 
question implied in the triad of our title, namely Inclusion, Measurement 
and Relevance, and ask, how is their implied place and relationship in 
the earlier analysis changed in the intervening five years. Should our 
analysis of the changes in the world since the earlier paper be reflect in 
what constitutes inclusion and how it can be measured? On balance, the 
two parts of our earlier argument are underlined and reinforced but more 
recently for the British, Brexit has intervened, and then much more re-
cently for the world, the COVID-19 pandemic has intervened, both of 
these threatening to overturn a world of steady change and stable argu-
ment. Firstly, any kind of social mobility and the agendas of inclusion, 
participation and opportunity are ever more problematic and challenged; 
progressively better measurement might only reveal this. Secondly, 
movement, fluidity and change - but now massive instability - are ever 
more pervasive and ubiquitous in our world, and that our capacity to un-
derstand, let alone measure, these and their relationship to equity and 
education will be poorly understood for months and years to come. The 
postdigital and the mobilities turn might just be collateral damage. 
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